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The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Recidivism Studies:
Myopic, Misleading, and Doubling Down on Imprisonment
I. Introduction
The six-year college graduation rate at public universities is
below 60%, and at privates it is 66%. Over one-third of
college students will not graduate within six years. While
some consider these numbers shocking and blame the
institutions, often they evince only a shrug. The focus is on
the success rate, not the failure rate. Recidivism numbers,
on the other hand, highlight failure. Even though federal
recidivism figures run close to the college noncompletion
rate, it is the negative number that is highlighted, not the
success rate. That negativity keeps the focus on more
selective incapacitation rather than forcing a discussion
about institutional barriers and reasons for failure.
Recidivism has become the new hallmark of criminal
justice reform, as reflected in the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission’s recidivism project. As of this writing, the Com-
mission has issued three reports in 2020 alone, which
ostensibly show the public safety threat posed by different
types of offenders upon release from federal prisons. They
also outline the parameters within which “safe” criminal
justice reform can proceed. The comparative drug studies
retrospectively validate the decrease in drug sentences as
public safety neutral and therefore vindicate the Commis-
sion’s and the courts’ early-release decisions.
The studies reinforce sentence length as one of two
crucial elements indicating the likelihood of reoffending.
The other is prior criminal history. Yet the overly broad
definition of “recidivism” and the focus on easily measur-
able and static risk factors create a feedback loop. Together
these studies serve to reenforce the status quo and the
Commission’s role in it.
Recidivism has now replaced rehabilitation as the
guiding principle of punishment. It is increasingly used
to steer criminal justice policy despite research limita-
tions. It serves as a stand-in for public safety, even
though lengthy incarceration may have criminogenic and
other negative ramifications for family members and
communities. Yet the Commission emphasizes recidi-
vism. It emphasizes what amounts to preemptive
imprisonment for those with long criminal records to
prevent future offending.
The Commission’s work should come with a warning
label. First, its recidivism studies should not be consumed
on their own. Instead they must be read in conjunction with
U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services recidivism research,
which includes data on the impact of programming, treat-
ment, and services on reentry success, including recidi-
vism. Second, the recidivism studies plainly raise questions
about the Commission’s role. Their negative tone and
ongoing preference for imprisonment indicate that the
Commission continues to adhere to its role as guardian of
pro-imprisonment guidelines. If the Commission were to
play a more useful and effective part in criminal justice
reform, it should consider using its research strength in
alternative ways to collaborate with other participants in the
federal system.
Part II discusses the Drugs Minus Two retroactive
guideline change and the judicial response. Part III turns
to the Commission’s recidivism study assessing reof-
fending by offenders who benefited from the decrease and
those who did not, and compares it to the Commission’s
earlier data set from its crack-cocaine early-release recidi-
vism study.
Part IV details the recidivism studies other government
agencies have prepared and compares their approaches.
Most of the discussion centers around studies done
through the Administrative Services of U.S. Courts, which
rely on probation data. With substantial changes in the
treatment options and approaches available to federal
probation officers, desistance and successful reintegration
have improved. Still, the U.S. approach continues to be
driven by concerns about undercounting recidivism
events. As Part V’s comparison to German recidivism
studies indicates, the approach in Western Europe is dif-
ferent. This is less about a disagreement of data collection
and analysis than it is a clash of philosophies and values
that reveals some of the underlying reasons for the dra-
matically different imprisonment rates between the two
countries.
Part VI circles back to the impact prison programming
and reentry assistance can exert on desistance and reof-
fending. It highlights opportunities for change in an indi-
vidual’s criminal career. The last section assesses the
Commission’s work in light of discussions around public
safety and the use of data in criminal justice. With the
heightened focus on recidivism and risk assessment, the
Commission’s approach is important and disturbing. It
threatens to propel us into data-driven selective incapaci-
tation and continuously long prison terms, all in the name
of public safety.
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II. Early Releases Under Amendments 782 and 788
In recent months the Commission has issued two data
reports on the federal offenders convicted of drug traffick-
ing felonies who were released early because of the Com-
mission’s 2014 decision to retroactively change the drug
quantity table.1 Amendment 782, also widely known as
“Drugs Minus Two,” decreased base offense levels under
the drug quantity table by two. Offense level 38 was retained
but with new and substantially higher threshold amounts.2
A few months later, Amendment 788 made that reduction
retroactive.3 The intended effect was to lower guideline
sentences so that mandatory minimums would fall into,
rather than below, the range.
In its official report outlining and justifying the proposed
adjustments, the Commission acknowledged that the origi-
nal sentence ranges needed to be modified to better reflect
culpability. Drug quantity was an uncertain and often mis-
leading measure of culpability, propelling the Commission
to change the drug guidelines to focus on the actual role the
offender played. Even though low-level offenders may handle
a large quantity of drugs, they exercise no control and their
financial gain is comparatively small.
The Commission also determined that previous sen-
tence levels were not required to ensure guilty pleas or lead
to cooperation with the government. Whether these are
legitimate considerations in setting sentence ranges may be
questioned, yet they carry important practical effects,
including the Department of Justice’s support for such
modifications. The rationale for the decrease also included
salutary effects on the federal criminal justice system in the
form of savings for the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
and decreased prison overcrowding.4
The Commission built this sentence reduction on its
2007 decrease of sentence levels for those convicted of
crack cocaine offenses. The resulting recidivism studies
that tracked the public safety impact of those convicted of
crack cocaine trafficking and released early found no public
safety impact.5 For that reason, the Commission predicted
that early releases for other drug offenders also would have
no negative effects on public safety.
The crack cocaine recidivism study was published in
May 2014, shortly before the Commission decided to
decrease all drug sentence levels. It compared reoffending
rates, five years after release, between crack cocaine offen-
ders released immediately before and those released after
the 2007 Crack Cocaine Amendments went into effect. The
former had served the full sentence imposed but would
have been eligible for early release under those amend-
ments; the latter benefited from a sentence reduction. The
recidivism rate, as defined by the Commission, was lower
among the group of offenders released early, though the
Commission found no statistically significant difference
between the two.6 This study proved the model for the
larger recidivism study at issue here.
Because of the large number of inmates eligible for
resentencing upon the sentence level decreases, the Com-
mission mandated that despite the Amendment’s
November 1, 2014, effective date, no releases would occur
until November 1, 2015. In its 2020 recidivism study on
these releases, the Commission notes that the delay in the
release date was “an enhanced public safety precaution.”7
To ensure public safety, the delay would provide courts with
time for individual assessments, allow offenders to move
into halfway houses, and prepare probation officers for the
larger number of offenders requiring supervision.
Before the guideline change, the average sentence for
common drug offenses was six years. After the change, the
Commission predicted, it would be five years and one
month—an eleven-month reduction. For those currently
incarcerated, however, the deduction would be larger, as
they had already spent longer in prison (nine years on
average). Yet many would not be released immediately,
even with the sentence reduction.8 Still, most would leave
prison one to two years before they could have expected at
sentencing. To most non-U.S. observers, the sentence
lengths for drug offenses remain startling. After all, even
with these sentence reductions, many of these offenders
will serve a decade in prison.
All federal district court decisions issued between late
2014 and October 1, 2019, on motions pursuant to
Amendments 782 and 788 are documented in the Com-
mission’s recidivism report from March 2020.9 District
courts received more than the 46,000 motions the Com-
mission had predicted. Still, they dispensed with the over
50,000 applications for reduced sentences with relative
ease and granted almost two-thirds of them. Across dis-
tricts, the numbers of applications differed starkly. Three of
the four Texas districts were at the top of the motions scale,
with a combined total of around 8,000 applications. Those
amounted to about 14% of applications nationwide. Almost
40% of motions came from twelve (out of ninety-four)
judicial districts. Just as the number of requests differed, so
did the grant rates. The Middle District of Louisiana had the
highest rate of denials, at 55.4%. A number of other districts
also denied more than half of the motions that came before
them. On the other hand, three districts granted every
motion, and four more came close.10 Most of the denials
went to offenders in criminal history category VI, many of
whom were statutorily precluded from benefiting.
The grant percentage may be connected to the origin of
the motions. While the defendant, the court, and the BOP
could have moved for a sentence reduction, the BOP never
did. Court involvement varied substantially. In both the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits, about a quarter of petitions
originated with the court. In the D.C. Circuit, defendants
filed all motions.11
The racial and ethnic makeup of offenders differed
substantially between the drug types at issue. While African
Americans made up 87% of the applicants in crack cocaine
cases, less than 3% of the applicants in methamphetamine
cases were black. The largest numbers of Hispanic offen-
ders were convicted of powder cocaine or marijuana traf-
ficking. About 86% of all applicants were African
American. Their grant rate was slightly below that of both
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White and Hispanic applicants. Three-quarters of the
motions granted went to U.S. citizens. Only 7% of sentence
reductions went to women.
Most of the decisions were straightforward.12 After all,
the primary consideration for a sentence reduction was the
type and amount of drugs at issue, both of which had been
found at sentencing. Many courts, therefore, chose to
amend the sentence by granting the full two-level reduc-
tion, leading to a new sentence at the low end of the new
guideline range.13
In its application note to Amendment 788, the Com-
mission reminded district courts that the application note
to § 1B1.10, which governs sentence reductions because of
a guideline amendment, requires them “to consider the
nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that may be posed by such a reduction.”14 In
the reasons district courts gave for denying motions for
a sentence reduction under Amendment 782, they men-
tioned 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, which include safety
considerations or protection of the public 3.4% and 2.7%
of the time, respectively. Most of the denials indicated that
the offender was ineligible for a decrease because of the
offender’s status as a career offender, a mandatory mini-
mum, the type of sentence imposed, or the offender
already having benefited from a 782 reduction, a depar-
ture, or a variance.15
The amount of reduction, in both number of months
and percentage decreases from the current sentence, var-
ied widely between districts and circuits. The District of
Rhode Island had the smallest percentage decrease, at
slightly below 14%, while Illinois Central saw sentences
decrease by more than one-quarter. That difference
amounted to 2.5 years.
Since the Commission had based its retroactive offense-
level decrease on the earlier crack cocaine recidivism study,
it replicated the study for the Amendment 782 reductions.
The two studies provide insights into the Commission’s
approach to recidivism and public safety.
III. “Drugs Minus Two” Recidivism Studied
The Commission’s 782 recidivism study was built on the
earlier crack cocaine study as Amendment 782 was mod-
eled on the decrease of crack cocaine base offense levels in
2007. After Congress adopted that decrease, the Commis-
sion made it retroactive the following year. In the subse-
quent three and a half years, the courts decided over 25,000
motions for sentence reductions. The overall grant rates
then were similar to those for Amendment 782 six years
later. Not quite two-thirds of the motions were granted,
a marginally higher percentage than for Drugs Minus Two.
Districts varied dramatically in their grant range, from a low
of 34.5% in Puerto Rico to 100% in seven districts, though
most of those saw a very low number of applications.16
Similarly, most of the denials occurred because offenders
were legally ineligible for the reduction. Six percent of the
denials could have reflected judicial concerns about the
impact on public safety.17
To assess “recidivism” in the five years after release, for
the crack-reduction study the Commission adopted the
following definition: “a reconviction for a new offense;
a rearrest with no case disposition information available;
or a revocation of an offender’s supervised release.”18 The
Commission modified this definition for the Drugs Minus
Two recidivism study.19 It included not only supervised
release revocations but also violations of their conditions if
they led to judicial actions. Only “minor traffic offenses”
were excluded.20
Both studies compare the Retroactivity Group, which
benefited from the reduction and was released early, with
the Comparison Group, which was released shortly before
the reduction became available but otherwise would have
been eligible for the reduction. Both studies ultimately
reached similar results, and their findings were often
unsurprising.
The Drugs Minus Two study found no statistically
significant difference between the two groups in their
recidivist rate. Generally the Retroactivity Group, which
served on average about seven years in prison while the
Comparison Group served about one year longer, was
less likely to run afoul of authorities. Their recidivism
rate was about 28%, whereas that of the Comparison
Group was 30.5%. Recidivism is slightly higher for
younger offenders and those with a higher criminal
history level.
Age and prior record are both standard risk factors. Even
though the federal guidelines do not allow for the consid-
eration of age at sentencing, the relationship of age to
reoffending is widely acknowledged. Virginia’s Commis-
sion, for example, built age explicitly into its diversion
scheme, which includes intermediate drug offenses.21 For
most offenders, the most crime-prone years end in their
mid- to late twenties. The older the offender at the time of
release, the less likely they are to commit reoffenses,
especially of a serious nature.
The Commission’s criminal history category is based, at
least partially, on the relationship between prior criminal
record and likelihood of reoffending. As the criminal his-
tory score goes up, so does the likelihood of recidivating.
Any prior connection with the criminal justice system, even
if it does not rise to the level of a conviction, increases the
likelihood of a reconviction, and more serious offenses are
more predictive of reoffending.22
Also unsurprising is the finding that recidivist events
are most likely to occur within the first twelve months upon
release, with their likelihood tapering off subsequently. For
both groups, the median time to recidivism was approxi-
mately fifteen months. While the crack cocaine study
looked at five years after release, the 2020 Drugs Minus
Two Retroactivity Study considers a three-year interval.
Given that post-release supervision in drug trafficking cases
was, on average, forty-nine months during fiscal year
2019,23 these studies largely capture times during which
the offenders were under supervised release—a time frame
in which return to prison in some cases will be based on
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noncriminal activity that amounts to a violation of super-
vised release requirements.
The Drugs Minus Two recidivism study provides greater
detail than the crack cocaine study on the type of recidivism
events measured. The latter study only separates arrests
from sentence revocations. About 10% of the released were
revoked, and a third of offenders were rearrested. The
recidivism rate for both crack offender groups was in the
mid-forty-percent range, which is substantially higher than
in Drugs Minus Two.
For both groups in the Drugs Minus Two study,
a third of the recidivism events were a court or super-
vision violation. A quarter fell into a miscellaneous cat-
egory, and a quarter were drug trafficking or possession
offenses, though there is no indication of the level of
offense or whether they triggered an arrest or led to
a conviction. The Commission indicates that for about
20% of recidivists in each group, a violent offense was
the most serious event, but almost half of those qualified
as “simple assault.”24 That means that for 6% of those
released, their worst recidivism event would be a simple
assault. Presumably, the other 6% would have commit-
ted more serious violent offenses.
The Commission praises both the Commissioners and
the federal judges for their judiciousness in setting out and
applying the sentence reduction guidelines. Because the
groups of those released early and those whose sentences
expired have very similar reoffending outcomes, the Com-
mission sees the care in release decisions as validated. It
indicates that courts focused on 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and
§ 1B1.10 to ensure public safety in denying a third of the
motions for a sentence reduction. According to the Com-
mission, almost a third of those, over 4,500, considered
§ 1B1.10. Curiously, the study then notes that “[p]articularly
noteworthy” is that courts issued 552 denials explicitly cit-
ing public safety as a reason and 362 denials based on post-
sentencing or post-conviction conduct.25 The latter may or
may not be public safety related. Even if one assumes that
all of these 914 denials are based on public safety concerns,
they constitute 5% of all denials and less than 2% of all
petitions. Those numbers do not indicate a federal judiciary
concerned about a highly dangerous offender population.
They also do not show a judiciary engaged in searching
analysis of motions with an eye to denying them. Instead,
assuming that the basic elements required for eligibility
were fulfilled, courts granted the motions except in very
unusual cases.
In fact, the Commission’s release criteria may have been
too narrow or the courts may have applied them too
restrictively. After all, the data show that the early release
group was slightly less likely to commit another offense
than those released before the sentence change. There may
have been more room for releases.
The Commission concludes, correctly, that the early
releases did not endanger public safety. Yet that conclusion
may be the most conservative that can be deduced from the
data. After all, the Commission applies such a broad
definition of recidivism that it pulls in acts that do not pose
any threat to the public and may not even indicate criminal
activity but rather antisocial behavior. Indeed, recidivism is
a markedly fluid term that may measure a broad array of
real and alleged rule violations.
IV. Defining Recidivism: The Goldilocks Approach or Let
a Thousand Flowers Bloom?
Recidivism has now become the hallmark of criminal jus-
tice reform. It is frequently used as a marker of public
safety. Low, or at least stable, recidivism is increasingly
a prerequisite of criminal justice reforms, at both the front
and back ends.
The Commission used its crack cocaine recidivism
study to support further drug law reform. In some states,
those charged with drug possession or low-level trafficking
and addicts benefit from diversion from a prison sentence
based on predictions of low recidivism. Yet recidivism
predictions have bedeviled other reform efforts, at least
indirectly. While nonviolent offenders have received sen-
tence discounts and alternative dispositions, those defined
as violent are incarcerated longer. The offense committed is
not the only predictor of recidivism. First offenders may
receive alternative sanctions based on the likelihood of their
reoffending. On the other hand, those with long records are
statistically at greater danger of recidivating and therefore
receive a sentence mark-up.26 The crack cocaine and Drugs
Minus Two recidivism studies reinforce the importance of
prior criminal record in recidivism.
Yet the increasing use and rising importance of recidi-
vism as a marker of public safety conceal the absence of
a uniform and shared definition. Recidivism studies differ
in time frame, definition of the event marked as recidivist,
and type and amount of data collected.
The Commission defines recidivism broadly, pulling in
both activities that are not adjudicated as criminal and those
that would not be a violation but for the offender’s super-
vision status. It appears most concerned about under-
counting recidivist events. That value choice leads it to rely
on rearrest data, for example. In an earlier recidivism study,
it bemoans that rearrests are only a weak measure of
recidivism and that “many crimes go unreported to police
or, if reported, do not result in an arrest.”27 That, however,
is a feature of all offense, not just recidivism, data.
The precautionary principle appears to drive the Com-
mission’s approach. It fears undercounting rather than
overestimating criminal conduct. That also explains the
wide net it casts with its inclusion of all kinds and levels of
offending.28
Even within the federal system, however, the Commis-
sion’s choice is not universally shared. Annually, the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) issues
a recidivism study on offenders placed on probation and
supervised release.
The AOUSC counts the first rearrest for serious criminal
activity during the supervision period. It excludes a host of
minor criminal offenses, misdemeanors, and petty
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offenses, because states report those inconsistently.29
Indeed, those reporting differences contribute to the dif-
ferences between state recidivism numbers, making the
latter less comparable and therefore less valuable. The
AOUSC also excludes arrests resulting from technical
probation violations. It deems those of a different nature
than criminal conduct and not indicative of future criminal
rule-breaking.
The AOUSC groups recidivist events into three cate-
gories: major (commission of a felony), minor (a misde-
meanor), and technical.30 Data on federal probation are in
many respects encouraging. Among drug offenders who
started their supervised release between 2010 and 2013,
only 18% were arrested within two years after release.
Among that 18%, a quarter were arrested for drug involve-
ment, but fewer than 20% for a violent offense. During that
time, almost three-quarters of drug offenders completed
supervision successfully. Among those who were returned
to prison, most frequently it was because they violated
supervision conditions.31
The Commission’s definition of recidivism events, on
the other hand, does not abide by any of the AOUSC lim-
itations. It counts all arrests, including those arising from
minor offenses, and supervision violations. As a result, the
Sentencing Commission’s data always show a higher level
of recidivism than the AOUSC studies.
“Technical” revocations are difficult to group in the
abstract. In many cases, they imply criminal conduct that
law enforcement did not further investigate because they
deemed revocation sufficiently punitive. Alternatively, they
may be the only sanction available when an offender
refuses compliance or continually fails despite additional
chances. Those situations, however, may not show new
offending. Probation data indicate the confluence of pro-
bation violations and new criminal conduct, though a large
percentage of technical violations do not show such new
criminal conduct.32
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) issued its own
study on the recidivism of federal offenders in 2016. It
analyzed the five years after offenders were put on super-
vision in 2005. Three-quarters of these offenders were on
post-release supervision. The study counted the first arrest,
even if it occurred for a technical supervision violation but
not for a traffic offense. More than two-thirds of arrests by
federal officers involved a supervision violation. State
arrests were more varied, though assault, general public
order offenses, driving under the influence, and drug pos-
session were the most frequent reasons.33 The broader
definition of recidivism events leads to results that are
closer to the Commission’s than to the AOUSC’s. Yet the
strength of the BJS study is its emphasis on the substantial
difference between arrests and prison returns. While the
cohort studied showed close to half being rearrested, less
than a third were reimprisoned.34
Even allowing for differences in the post-release time
frame the studies employ, they demonstrate the impact
that the definition of recidivism events has on their
findings and conclusions. Since its definition of recidi-
vism is the slimmest, of the three, the AOUSC study will
always show the lowest recidivism rate among federal
offenders. The Sentencing Commission and the BJS
recidivism studies paint a less favorable picture of federal
releases. Yet BJS data challenge the assumption that all
recidivist events are equally problematic or have the same
impact on public safety.
Differences in the length of recidivism studies may
result from outside time constraints, the urgent demand for
results, availability of and access to data, or other method-
ological constraints. Federal recidivism studies tend to
occur at the three- to five-year mark. Most federal offenders
are under supervision during some or all of that time
frame. The latest Commission data indicate that courts
order supervised release in about three-quarters of
offenses. Almost all drug trafficking offenders have super-
vised release included in their sentence. On average, the
term of supervised release imposed hits three years. For
drug trafficking offenders, however, it clocks in at four.35
During that entire time, supervisees are subject to super-
vision rules, whose violations may lead to an arrest and
reimprisonment. The inclusion of supervision violations,
therefore, increases the recidivism count during all or
a substantial part of the time frame of these recidivism
studies.36
These three studies embrace a number of different
methodological approaches to assess recidivism. Despite
their differences, they agree ultimately on what may be
dubbed the “relevant conduct” accounting for recidivism.
Under all of these measurements, the focus is on further
criminal conduct rather than on the formal justice system’s
response. All studies indicate that the data present a sub-
stantial undercount as crimes remain undetected or unre-
ported. This implies that “true recidivism” rates are
substantially higher, that released offenders are more dan-
gerous than the numbers indicate. The approach also sug-
gests distrust of the criminal justice system. The legal
system discounts criminal conduct through plea bargain-
ing, declines to prosecute, or is hamstrung by legal rules
from arriving at a conviction or sentence. The prevailing
approach to recidivism makes an end run around the
criminal justice system with the focus on arrest data. For
these recidivism studies, it was of greater importance to
document recidivism as accurately as possible than to focus
solely on legal confirmation of criminal conduct. Yet other
countries do not count recidivist events in the same way,
which can lead to a very different approach to imprison-
ment, to criminal offenders, and to the criminal justice
system itself. The framing of recidivism impacts not only
criminal justice policy but broader societal attitudes toward
those looking for another chance.
V. How Exceptional Are U.S. Recidivism Rates?
In recent years, many reformers have looked to Continental
Western Europe for inspiration to decrease the size of our
criminal justice system. Those countries have much lower
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imprisonment rates and ostensibly much lower recidivism
rates. While little attention has been paid to the latter, the
tenor of the recidivism discussion there may be just as
instructive as the data.
Even with a uniform set of definitions and methodology,
recidivism rates would be difficult to compare within the
United States. Reporting of offenses differs, as do charging
and plea-bargaining policies. Both the Commission and
BJS indicate that a reason for counting supervision viola-
tions is that in cases of a new offense, some law enforce-
ment agencies would record a new crime, some note
a supervision violation, and some do both. Similarly, pro-
secutors may differ between charging the new crime or
proceeding based on the supervision violation.37
These differences highlight how much more difficult
cross-country recidivism studies will be. Among the most
pronounced differences will be the definition and catego-
rization of offenses, supervision guidelines, prosecution
patterns, sentence types, and lengths of prison terms. Yet
a comparison between the Commission’s and a leading
German recidivism study highlights the different choices
made in assessing recidivism and some of the assumptions
and perspectives that underlie those choices. It also illu-
minates ensuing public policy ramifications.
A. The German Recidivism Study: Definitions and
Findings
A detailed German recidivism study, published in 2016,
defines a recidivist event exclusively as a conviction. It
does not include any criminal justice action that falls
short of a new entry in the central criminal registry.38
Any arrests and charges unresolved at the end of the
German study’s three-year time frame are not captured
as recidivist events. The difference in the impact this
choice has on German recidivism statistics, as compared
to U.S. studies, is marked.
Dismissals and abbreviated proceedings of different
types dominate German prosecutorial statistics. Germany
does not distinguish between federal and state prosecu-
tions, so the crimes at issue include both federal and state-
level offenses. The German criminal procedure code
explicitly permits prosecutorial dismissals for minor
offenses that are akin to misdemeanors, if the offender’s
guilt is trivial and there is no public interest in a prosecu-
tion.39 Misdemeanors can also be resolved through penal
orders, which may lead to either a fine or a suspended jail
term. The authors of the recidivism study indicate that once
formal charges are filed in these cases, they usually result in
a penal order.40 In contrast to the Commission study,
offenses for which no formal charge is filed are not counted
as criminal convictions.
Despite differences both in the definition of recidivism
and in offender populations, after three years about the
same percentage of offenders—one-third—recidivated in
Germany. Most of them did not receive an unsuspended
prison term. Recidivism rates differed between offenders
who had served time and those who had been sanctioned in
other ways. For those who completed a prior prison term,
the recidivism rate hovered close to one-half. For juveniles
sentenced to juvenile correctional institutions, the rate
climbed to two-thirds. Those convicted of violations under
the narcotics laws had a relatively high recidivism rate (over
50% after six years).41
Similar to U.S. data, most relapses occur during the
first year after conviction or release from imprisonment.
Even though the large German recidivism study focuses
primarily on a three-year time horizon, a longer six-year
period shows only “a minor rise of the reconviction
rate.”42 The difference between three and six years is nine
percentage points, from 35% to 44%. After nine years the
number increases to 47.5%, almost half of those with
a criminal record.43
Generally, those sentenced to a fine only, which is the
primary disposition even for felony-level offenses, were less
likely to recidivate than offenders sentenced to prison. This
may not be surprising, as fines are generally imposed for
less serious crimes and on offenders who “show a favour-
able prognosis.”44 With federal sentencing almost entirely
focused on imprisonment, comparable data are nonexis-
tent. In fiscal year 2019, 89% of federal offenders were
sentenced to prison only; 0.5% got a fine-only sentence, and
6% probation only.45 The pool of nonprison sentences is
too small to draw any (reliable) conclusions about recidi-
vism, especially since they are closely tied to certain crimes
and prior criminal record.46 The frequency of nonprison
terms in the German study reflects, in part, the types of
cases adjudicated but also the more limited frequency with
which German courts impose nonsuspended sentences.
Just as in the United States, longer criminal records are
connected to a greater likelihood of recidivating in Germany.
They are also tied directly to more severe sentences.47
In subsequent sentencing, only about 3% of recidivist
events in Germany will lead to adult imprisonment within
three years, which reflects the relatively minor nature of
subsequent offending. Those initially sentenced to a custo-
dial sentence are, however, the most likely to receive
another custodial sentence. About one-third of younger
offenders are reincarcerated, but less than a quarter of older
offenders are.48
Comparable to the Commission’s data is the German
finding that desistance increases continuously after age
twenty-five. From a high of 45% for the youngest offender
group, ages fourteen to fifteen, desistance drops initially to
40%, where it plateaus before it climbs again. The most
likely reoffender group is between twenty-one and twenty-
four, and even for them the chance is higher that they will
not cross paths with the criminal justice system again. By
the time those with a criminal record enter their mid-
twenties, desistance increases, and by their sixties it stands
at 85%. Prison and probation sentences both decline pro-
gressively from the mid-twenties on. Yet those with prior
prison sentences have the highest recidivism rates in every
age group, from slightly below 50% for those between
twenty-five and twenty-nine to about 35% for those over
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sixty.49 The data cannot resolve the question of the extent to
which the initial sentence reflects a poor social prognosis
that persists, uninterrupted by imprisonment or whether
the prison reinforces it.
Gender-based findings hold across the two countries,
too. Gender substantially impacts desistance rates on both
sides of the Atlantic. In Germany, women’s recidivism rate
(26%) is substantially lower than that of men (37%). The
adult women most likely to recidivate served time previ-
ously. For that group the statistical difference from male
recidivism rates is relatively limited, at only 6%. About 17%
of females returned to prison within three years, compared
to 26% of men.50 As in the United States, the absolute
number of women in the criminal justice system is sub-
stantially smaller than the number of men.51
The Commission study includes only U.S. citizens.
Noncitizens with a federal drug conviction would be
removed from the United States upon release. The German
study, on the other hand, includes foreign nationals,
though those with the longest prison terms are the most
likely to be deported, which may explain their substantially
lower recidivism rate following a prison sentence. Yet that
pattern was replicated for other sanctions, though to a more
limited extent.52 Whether fear of deportation is the primary
incentive to limit further run-ins with the law or other ele-
ments of the immigrant background or status explain the
differential is unclear.
The data show substantial parallels but ultimately great
differences in the number of offenders who are returned to
prison. One important limitation of the information pro-
vided, however, is that revocation of supervision, either
during probation or after release, is not explicitly included
in the recidivism study. Revocation data are being compiled
by the national probation office but are not being published
regularly. If revocations were considered, they might shed
a somewhat different light on some of these data points. For
example, 2011 supervision figures from most of the western
part of Germany show revocations in 29% of cases for
adults. Most of these are likely to have occurred because of
new offenses. Those—and offenses not leading to reincar-
ceration—would be captured in the recidivism study. Yet
any revocations for technical violations would not be
included.53
Differences in definitional choices clearly impact recid-
ivism findings. Nevertheless, many of the trends show
substantial parallels. Still, European recidivism studies
often differ markedly in rhetoric and tone.
B. The Framing of Recidivism
While translations camouflage some of the German
phrasings, the German publications have a sharply differ-
ent tone than U.S. studies, including the Commission’s.
First, the research regularly speaks of Legalbewährung,
which amounts to desistance. Effectively the terminological
choice focuses not on recidivism but on its opposite. The
term captures the person’s ability to continue a life without
further offending, or at least without any offending that
registers formally. Second, much of the discussion
emphasizes the relatively minor nature of subsequent
offending, as captured in the reimprisonment rate. Third,
reoffending data are based solely on new convictions rather
than on arrests or probation violations. This reflects and
reinforces confidence in the legal system and also shows
the difference between proven reoffending, allegations of
crime, and the violation of supervision rules. Supervision
violations are counted toward the existing offense, rather
than being considered recidivist events.
All of these differences are substantial, not solely sta-
tistically but in the values they display. Most people with
a criminal conviction do not reoffend. In Germany a new
offense, however, is deemed neither a systemic nor an
individual failure if it is relatively minor, which equals any
nonprison sentence. The framing of recidivism, therefore,
is important for the criminal justice system and the
expectations and trust citizens place in it. This is even more
essential during times of reform.
The importance of framing has been studied initially in
the context of medical decision making, with the so-called
“Asian disease.”54 Decision makers are provided with two
logically equivalent questions, one framed positively in
terms of lives saved (or money gained), the other negatively
as lives (or money) lost. The choices respondents make
differ depending on whether the problem is presented from
a gain or a loss perspective. The former leads to respon-
dents acting averse to risk while the latter makes them more
risk tolerant. That means they opt for the more certain
positive outcome.55 The effects of framing differ based on
the respondents’ educational attainment and their level of
data sophistication. The type of data presentation—
numerical or visual—also affects outcomes. Framing
studies have now been done in numerous fields, though
rarely in criminal justice.56
Framing studies based on the “Asian disease” frame-
work in the criminal justice field have focused on risk-based
police decision making. The framing of recidivism lends
itself to this analysis, too. The Sentencing Commission’s
reports, as well as other recidivism studies in the United
States, focus on failure, defined broadly. For example, the
Commission carefully defines and counts subsequent
arrests and serious supervision failures, independent of
whether they amount to criminal offending. German data,
on the other hand, focus heavily on whether persons with
a prior record remain free of subsequent convictions and
especially of serious crime. Once the data are reframed in
that manner, even new convictions frequently indicate that
the individual presents no threat and that the system works
effectively. With this approach, the longer the desistance
period, the more successful the approach the criminal jus-
tice system employed initially.
Some U.S. reentry programs have begun to focus on
desistance and the length of time during which an offender
avoids running afoul of law enforcement. Similar to drug
and alcohol abstinence programs, no longer is the success
measured in a binary manner. Instead success becomes
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a more sophisticated question about the length of time an
offender can abstain from crime. Desistance goals should
also include the seriousness of reoffending.
The framing of success and failure is closely related to
the question of who is to blame or reward for the outcome.
Is subsequent offending the individuals’ fault because they
failed to “learn their lesson,” or is it a systemic failure
because prison causes more crime or because reentry
efforts are insufficient? Success, on the other hand, could
focus on opportunities and support for change during
incarceration and at reentry, rather than on the individual’s
innate characteristics. These questions, however, are
missing from the Sentencing Commission’s analysis. Its
recidivism studies focus exclusively on the crime of con-
viction and prior criminal record as predictors of recidi-
vism. They fail to consider the impact prison programming
or reentry assistance may have had on offenders. The fed-
eral probation service frequently emphasizes those ele-
ments in its efforts to decrease recidivism.
VI. Not a Black Box: Prison Programming and Reentry
Support
The starting point for the Sentencing Commission’s Drugs
Minus Two recidivism study, like its crack recidivism study,
is the change in the length of the sentences served. Even
though the offenders released served, on average, between
six and ten years in prison and subsequently were on
supervised release for three to five years, the Commission
treats those years essentially as a black box. Yet the oppor-
tunities of which offenders availed themselves and the
services available, inside and outside of prison, differed.
While the impact of prison programming on post-release
desistance lacks detailed and specific evaluation and
remains often uncertain, U.S. Probation and Pretrial Ser-
vices carefully evaluated and changed its techniques to
facilitate reentry and prevent reoffending.
A. Prison Programming
Investment in programming indicates that we have left
behind the “Nothing Works era,” though we are still in the
process of determining “what works.” Despite or perhaps
because of the proliferation of in-prison programs in BOP
facilities, there is little knowledge as to what types of pro-
gramming work most effectively, on their own or in com-
bination with others.57 Many current BOP programs are
neither evidence-based nor validated. Yet meta-studies and
assessments of specific small-scale programs indicate the
effectiveness of programming, at least in reducing recidi-
vism. Large prison-based residential drug and alcohol
treatment programs have undergone robust assessment.
Their evaluations indicate that individuals who have gone
through them adjust better upon prison release, which
includes preventing relapse and arrest. However, selection
bias in admissions may overestimate the impact of these
programs. Since other factors, such as a strong social net-
work, also play an important role in post-release success,
the precise role of any program is difficult to ascertain.58
Evidence indicates that even program participation by
itself lowers the risk of reoffending. Whether that is
a function of the programs offered or rather of the charac-
teristics that motivate some imprisoned persons to partici-
pate and ultimately help with their reentry and desistance
remains unclear.59 Even though we are far from under-
standing the effectiveness of prison programming, clearly it
matters. Yet recidivism studies fail to reflect that fact,
implying that the sentence imposed or served and prior
record are destiny. While the Commission noted over-
crowding as a reason for Amendments 782 and 788, the
recidivism studies fail to account for its potential impact on
opportunities for program participation and effective
release preparation.60
Reentry preparation and the probation officer assigned
are often crucial tools for offender success. Probation ser-
vices made substantial changes in the programming
offered and supervision styles to be more effective. Recid-
ivism studies, however, do not credit their work but instead
often paint recidivism as almost inevitable.
B. Probation Supervision and Reentry Assistance
About three-quarters of federal offenders are sentenced to
a period of supervised release after release from impris-
onment. For those convicted of drug trafficking offenses,
that figure is even higher. The supervision period for drug
offenders runs between three and five years, a substantial
period of time.61
Because the Commission compares recidivism rates at
different release cycles, it may not compare identical
populations. Federal probation data indicate that those
currently released from prison have a worse reoffending
prognosis than earlier cohorts. Between 1997 and 2013,
the risk prediction score that federal probation uses
increased by 50%. The number of career offenders and
armed career criminals increased even more62 but did not
play a role in the Commission’s Drugs Minus Two study.
The description of the composition of the released popu-
lation implies either that judges were generally inclined to
give the drug discount even to a riskier population group
or that these drug offenders are not part of the group with
a worse prognosis.
The levels at which probation officers uncover supervi-
sion violations, which they are required to report, have also
increased substantially. They have an extensive array of
electronic supervision tools at their disposal, and their drug
testing ability has improved substantially.63 All of these
changes increase the likelihood of detection and could
impact the number of revocations. Yet revocation rates have
remained stable.
Federal probation officers are charged with assisting an
offender to avoid future criminal offending. The risk an
offender presents is the baseline starting point from which
they assess the client’s needs and then attempt to target
services appropriately, adjusting them to the individual
person’s learning style. With growing knowledge about
strategies that work with offenders, interventions can be
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more targeted and pave the way for successful
reintegration.
Federal offenders come with a combination of chal-
lenges. About 25% face substance abuse issues. A quarter
received a point increase at sentencing for involvement of
a gun. While 20% got a role adjustment downward, for 10%
their role made them more culpable. Two-thirds had prior
convictions, and even more had been arrested previously.
Forty percent of those with a prior criminal record ran afoul
of supervision rules. Almost all had allegations of violence
against them. Federal probation, however, focuses not
solely on such directly measurable indicators but also on
other, less tangible predictors of success, such as their cli-
ents’ thinking and social network. A quarter display anti-
social thinking, but almost all have family and friends with
strong prosocial tendencies. Criminogenic factors that
reach well beyond a criminal record have a decidedly neg-
ative impact on reoffending.64 Outside elements easily
aggravate these risk factors. Among the most pressing are
housing insecurity and financial pressures.65 More risk
factors increase the need for robust assistance upon release.
Staffing and budget cuts to probation services
threaten positive results and increase revocations,66
which count as an important marker of reoffending. The
recidivism rate is not exclusively tied to the offender and
does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, congressional
investment in the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services
system—in removing barriers to reentry and providing
programming for those released—impacts recidivism
rates as they are currently defined.
In that the Commission’s drug retroactivity study com-
paring two cohorts finds no impact of early release on
offending, it supports the case for earlier release to protect
the public purse. It omits the case for the probation sys-
tem’s role in addressing recidivism and its need for fund-
ing. Data from U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services show
this, as they detail both challenges and the impact of
interventions on behavior.
As the probation service approaches those released with
the knowledge and confidence that it can make a positive
impact, the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts in which it
is housed has adopted a recidivism model that may be
called conservative. The Commission remains firmly in the
authoritarian camp, however.67 It portrays offenders as
defined by their criminal history and the crime of which
they were convicted. Crime is not a social phenomenon but
instead remains a personal failing. On the other hand, the
probation service sees crime as arising from a mix of per-
sonal and societal shortcomings.
Sentencing, offender background information, and
supervision intervention data together provide a much
richer and nuanced picture of federal recidivism and of
the impact that probation can have on reentry. Corre-
lating recidivism with sentence length and criminal
history only may provide support for current sentence
levels but is unable to effectively determine the ideal
point for public safety.
VII. Conclusion
The criminal justice system and federal sentencing cannot
fix existing social inequities that have impacted many
defendants long before they came to court. However, it can
operate on the maxim of doing no harm, and that includes
averting harm both to those convicted in federal court and
the greater public.
The differences between the three federal offices in
defining and counting recidivism is confusing at best and,
in part, downright misleading. They also invite different
policy responses.
The Commission’s work is grounded deeply in risk
prediction and management. It proceeds from the
assumption that the state through its sentencing practices
can guarantee security, by incapacitating and deterring
offenders.68 Its set of recidivism studies reflect its ongoing
attempt to present sentence lengths and criminal record,
the two factors that drive federal sentencing, as determi-
native for future offending, and therefore for public safety.
Rather than allowing for the prevention of future crime
through modifications of social opportunities and individ-
ual thinking patterns, the Commission continuously
attempts to find ways to focus prison lengths most effec-
tively. While the AOUSC distinguishes between criminal
wrongdoing and rule violations, the Commission does not.
Its focus on correlating prior offending with later offending
led it to conclude in an earlier, broader study that “the past
predicts the future.”69 That assessment emphasizes the
deterrent impact of long sentences and justifies lengthier
risk-based sentences for those with more extensive prior
records, potentially unrestrained by level of culpability and
severity of the new offenses. It reinforces the “nothing
works” philosophy that discarded rehabilitation as an aim
of federal sentencing. Its apparent disregard of the influ-
ence of post-sentence supervision and in-prison program-
ming is yet more surprising, given that the probation
service is housed within the administrative office for federal
courts and probation officers work closely with federal
judges, whose work is the Commission’s focus.
The different recidivism studies display more than
a disagreement about definitions. They show substantial
dissension over the purposes of punishment and the
meaning of public safety. Their tone and research design
are not only important for future Commission decisions on
early release and length of imprisonment, they may also
inform the construction of algorithms that predict risk.70
Yet the research designs reveal the many choices and pit-
falls of such risk-based sentencing that fails to allow for the
impact of interventions.
Even though the differences between the U.S. studies
are marked, the comparison with the German study high-
lights some of the challenges to criminal justice reform.
Most startling may be the failure of the United States to
trust its criminal justice system, as indicated by the inclu-
sion of arrests and supervision violations in its recidivism
studies. Similarly, the U.S. studies regularly focus on the
multitude of crimes committed by those with a criminal
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record but not captured, indicating that the population is
much more dangerous than the data show. The German
studies, on the other hand, repeatedly highlight the rela-
tively minor nature of future offending, a point made in one
of the Commission studies almost in passing. The differ-
ences in emphasis evince strikingly different attitudes, both
toward the state as guarantor of security and toward the
individual’s ability and willingness to follow rules and
orders.
Nothing displays the differences in recidivism numbers
more powerfully than their public portrayal. In a report on
recidivism, a leading German magazine’s byline concluded
that “only 35% of offenders commit another offense.” The
word “only” captures the attitudinal difference between the
two sides of the Atlantic most aptly.71
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